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Elizabeth Schechter

Picture of Elizabeth Schechter

Associate Professor, Philosophy

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Cognitive Science
Philosophy of Mind

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Two candidate cases of multiple personhood

Disunified behavior doesn't mean multiple personhood, except when the subject says so.

Philosophy

Author/Lead: Elizabeth Schechter
Dates:

The split-brain phenomenon and dissociative identity disorder (DID) have been posed as candidate cases of multiple persons in one body. Philosophers have typically argued that DID subjects are better candidates for multiple personhood because their behavior is more disunified. While a DID subject is intuitively more like multiple persons than is a split-brain subject, I argue here that the grounds of this intuition do not concern disunified behavior per se. Rather, they concern the differing self-conceptions of split-brain subjects on the one hand and at least many DID subjects on the other.

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