WiP - Joe Gurrola / Moral Motivation and Moral Worth
WiP - Joe Gurrola / Moral Motivation and Moral Worth
Wednesday February 12, Joe Gurrola leads the Work-in-Progress meeting with discussion "Moral Motivation and Moral Worth: Challenging the Right-Reasons Account".
Abstract: Many theories of moral worth appear promising when motivation is a black box. But the same theories appear less promising once we know more about the nature of motivation. This paper argues that the right-reasons account of moral worth is one such theory. The paper begins by presenting a case of morally worthy action. It then shows that the action cannot count as morally worthy on the right-reasons account. This conclusion is defended by an appeal to recent work in the cognitive sciences. This research indicates that the action in question cannot be motivated in the way the right-reasons account requires morally worthy actions be motivated. The conclusion is that the right-reasons account is in conflict with cognitive science. Since we do not want to give up our best empirical theories of motivation, we should aim to revise the right-reasons account, or else look elsewhere for a theory of moral worth.