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WiP - Ilaria Canavotto / How do complex arguments constrain simpler ones?

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WiP - Ilaria Canavotto / How do complex arguments constrain simpler ones?

Philosophy Wednesday, April 22, 2026 1:00 pm - 2:00 pm Skinner Building, 1116

Wednesday Aprill 22, we learn about how to reason on precedents from Ilaria Canavotto, who will present her new work at our Work in Progress meeting.


We often treat earlier decisions as constraining later ones, especially when they involve competing arguments about what to do. Yet such arguments can differ in structure: an earlier decision may rest on a complex argument that integrates considerations across multiple levels, while a later decision may be supported by a simpler line of reasoning that sets some of those considerations aside. This raises a general question: how do more complex arguments constrain simpler ones? Building on a hierarchical model of precedent-based reasoning developed with Jeff, I evaluate two strategies for explaining such constraint: a flattening strategy and a derived-priority strategy. I argue that the flattening strategy fails as an account of how complex arguments constrain simpler ones in two important respects. I then use these failures to motivate two rules for implementing the derived-priority strategy.

Add to Calendar 04/22/26 13:00:00 04/22/26 14:00:00 America/New_York WiP - Ilaria Canavotto / How do complex arguments constrain simpler ones?

Wednesday Aprill 22, we learn about how to reason on precedents from Ilaria Canavotto, who will present her new work at our Work in Progress meeting.


We often treat earlier decisions as constraining later ones, especially when they involve competing arguments about what to do. Yet such arguments can differ in structure: an earlier decision may rest on a complex argument that integrates considerations across multiple levels, while a later decision may be supported by a simpler line of reasoning that sets some of those considerations aside. This raises a general question: how do more complex arguments constrain simpler ones? Building on a hierarchical model of precedent-based reasoning developed with Jeff, I evaluate two strategies for explaining such constraint: a flattening strategy and a derived-priority strategy. I argue that the flattening strategy fails as an account of how complex arguments constrain simpler ones in two important respects. I then use these failures to motivate two rules for implementing the derived-priority strategy.

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