Meaning Meeting - Caleb Kendrick / Question-sensitive ability ascriptions
Meaning Meeting - Caleb Kendrick / Question-sensitive ability ascriptions
September 21 at the Meaning Meeting, Caleb Kendrick presents his recent thoughts on how the ascription of abilities depends on the topic of conversation.
There’s an asymmetry in strength between ability can and its negation can’t. While it’s perfectly acceptable to say “I can φ, but I won’t φ,” it’s unacceptable to assert “I can’t φ, but I will φ.” This suggests that, if you can’t φ, then you won’t φ–in other words, can’t φ entails ¬φ. However, this principle appears incompatible with another seemingly true principle. As Kenny (1975) observed, φing doesn’t always entail an ability to φ–hitting a bullseye by sheer luck doesn’t entail an ability to hit bullseyes. But, φ entails can φ is simply the contrapositive of can’t φ entails ¬φ. We resolve this apparent tension by developing a trivalent semantics where ability can is treated as a quantifier over answers to a salient deliberative question.