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Julia Markovits

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Julia Markovits

Philosophy Friday, February 28, 2025 3:00 pm - 5:00 pm Skinner Building, 1115
Title:  Praise and Blame in the Absence of Moral Knowledge
 
Abstract:   Many philosophers have argued that knowledge of the moral status of our action is prerequisite for our being apt targets of praise and blame for that action.  This requirement is in tension with an account of praise and blameworthiness that I find independently attractive, according to which praiseworthiness is (very roughly) a matter of being motivated in the right way by the considerations that in fact count in favor, morally, of our action, and blameworthiness is, very roughly, after a matter of failing to be so motivated (regardless of our moral beliefs).  In other words, praiseworthiness (and blameworthiness) are a matter of concern (or lack of it) for what really matters, morally, though not necessarily under that description. 
 
In my talk, I will look at three classes of arguments for the view that praise- and blameworthiness require moral knowledge and argue that all three fail to provide reasons to depart from the moral concern view.  The knowledge requirement also faces additional problems.  And the moral concern view has more resources to explain puzzling features of our practice of praising and blaming than defenders of the reflexivity requirement presume.


 

Add to Calendar 02/28/25 15:00:00 02/28/25 17:00:00 America/New_York Julia Markovits
Title:  Praise and Blame in the Absence of Moral Knowledge
 
Abstract:   Many philosophers have argued that knowledge of the moral status of our action is prerequisite for our being apt targets of praise and blame for that action.  This requirement is in tension with an account of praise and blameworthiness that I find independently attractive, according to which praiseworthiness is (very roughly) a matter of being motivated in the right way by the considerations that in fact count in favor, morally, of our action, and blameworthiness is, very roughly, after a matter of failing to be so motivated (regardless of our moral beliefs).  In other words, praiseworthiness (and blameworthiness) are a matter of concern (or lack of it) for what really matters, morally, though not necessarily under that description. 
 
In my talk, I will look at three classes of arguments for the view that praise- and blameworthiness require moral knowledge and argue that all three fail to provide reasons to depart from the moral concern view.  The knowledge requirement also faces additional problems.  And the moral concern view has more resources to explain puzzling features of our practice of praising and blaming than defenders of the reflexivity requirement presume.


 

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