Skip to main content
Skip to main content

CSC - Roman Feiman / What even is a thought? How compositional semantics can inform psychology

A bearded young man in a blue shirt and glasses, standing in front of a bookcase.

CSC - Roman Feiman / What even is a thought? How compositional semantics can inform psychology

Linguistics | Philosophy Thursday, March 14, 2024 3:30 pm - 5:30 pm H.J. Patterson Hall,

Pi Day 2024, the Cognitive Science Colloquium has Roman Feiman, from Brown University, presenting his work with the Language and Thought Lab on infant cognition and the acquisition of semantics.


What even is a thought? How compositional semantics can inform psychology

When we speak, we express thoughts. When others understand the meanings of our utterances, they think the thoughts that we expressed. While psychologists have long been interested in what thoughts are, linguists have made a lot of progress characterizing what utterances mean. In this talk, I'll argue for a methodology for psychologists who are interested in thinking: take up linguists' formal theories of meaning as candidate computational-level descriptions of thought. I will share experimental work that takes this approach, showing how this view of thought can shed new light on long-standing debates in psychology: whether logical reasoning is natural, how children learn words, and whether thought precedes or co-develops with language.

Add to Calendar 03/14/24 15:30:00 03/14/24 17:30:00 America/New_York CSC - Roman Feiman / What even is a thought? How compositional semantics can inform psychology

Pi Day 2024, the Cognitive Science Colloquium has Roman Feiman, from Brown University, presenting his work with the Language and Thought Lab on infant cognition and the acquisition of semantics.


What even is a thought? How compositional semantics can inform psychology

When we speak, we express thoughts. When others understand the meanings of our utterances, they think the thoughts that we expressed. While psychologists have long been interested in what thoughts are, linguists have made a lot of progress characterizing what utterances mean. In this talk, I'll argue for a methodology for psychologists who are interested in thinking: take up linguists' formal theories of meaning as candidate computational-level descriptions of thought. I will share experimental work that takes this approach, showing how this view of thought can shed new light on long-standing debates in psychology: whether logical reasoning is natural, how children learn words, and whether thought precedes or co-develops with language.

H.J. Patterson Hall false