Patricia S. Greenspan
AOS: Moral Philosophy, Moral Psychology, Philosophy of Action
Office: Skinner 1011A

Patricia Greenspan (PhD, Harvard) is Professor of Philosophy. Her main areas of research are moral philosophy, moral psychology, and philosophy of action. She is the author of two books on the role of emotions in rational and moral motivation and several articles on emotions, rationality, metaethics, and free will. Recently she has contributed to a volume of interviews with leading figures in philosophy of action and has presented papers at the International Wittgenstein Symposium, the Wisconsin Metaethics Workshop, and the Social Philosophy and Policy Center at Bowling Green.

Practical Guilt: Moral Dilemmas, Emotions, and Social Norms (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).

Emotions and Reasons: An Inquiry into Emotional Justification (New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall, 1988).

"Practical Reasoning and Emotion," in The Oxford Handbook of Rationality, ed. by A. Mele and P. Rawling (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).

"Resting Content: Sensible Satisficing?," American Philosophical Quarterly, Special Issue on Rationality, 46 (2009).

"Emotions, Rationality, and Mind/Body": Royal Institute for Philosophy Conference on Emotions, 2001

"Emotional Strategies and Rationality," Ethics, 110 (2000), 469-87

"Subjective Guilt and Responsibility," Mind, 101 (1992), 287-303. Reprinted in R. J. Wallace (ed.), Reason, Emotion, and Will, International Research Library of Philosophy (Hampshire, U.K.: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 1999).

"Guilt and Virtue," Journal of Philosophy, 91 (1994), 57-70.

"Free Will and the Genome Project," Philosophy and Public Affairs, 22 (1993), 31-43.

"Conditional Oughts and Hypothetical Imperatives," Journal of Philosophy, 72 (1975), 259-76.