Philosophy Colloquium
Carolina Satoorio
University of Arizona
Indeterministic Compatibilism

Free will compatibilists are typically focused on arguing that determinism is compatible with free will. Most compatibilists also think, however, that indeterminism is compatible with free will too. Unsurprisingly, given compatibilism’s main aim, little work has been done on this aspect of compatibilism. Still, it is important to think about this, if one is interested in developing a view of free will that doesn’t hinge on determinism being actually true or false—and I am one of those compatibilists. In this paper, I will look at this issue from the perspective of a compatibilist view that I have developed and defended elsewhere (Causation and Free Will, OUP 2016): a view where freedom is accounted for in terms of responsiveness to reasons, and where responsiveness to reasons is in turn a feature that is directly reflected in the actual causal histories of our behavior. In the first part of the paper I will argue that, assuming this compatibilist view of free will, indeterminism is compatible with free will. Still, as we will see, the assumption of indeterminism gives rise to some novel and interesting questions concerning the nature of indeterministic causation. The second part of the paper will be concerned with motivating and discussing those questions.

Friday, October 4, 2019

Skinner 1115